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JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("URAP") Rule 24(a)(4), this 
Court has jurisdiction in accordance with Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78A-3-
102(3)G) and (4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(b )( 1 ), Appellee is dissatisfied with Appellant's 
Statement of Issues. URAP Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (B) require Appellant to provide a 
citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a 
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. In the 
present case, Appellant's brief fails to satisfy such requirement. Furthermore, the issues 
presented in Appellant's brief do not accurately reflect those subsequently argued therein. 
Accordingly, the following issues are argued in Appellant's brief: 
ISSUE #1. Whether the trial court erred by neglecting to analyze the contract as 
an installment agreement. See Appellant's brief Pg. 9. This issue was not preserved for 
appeal. 
ISSUE #2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that an oral modification to 
a written agreement is subject to the four-year statute of limitations. See Appellant's brief 
Pg. 11. "[T]he application of a statute of limitation is a legal determination which we 
review for correctness, however, to the extent that the statute of limitations analysis 
involves subsidiary factual determinations, we review those factual determinations using 
a clearly erroneous standard." Griffin v. Cutler, 339 P.3d 100, 103 if 14 (Utah App. 2014) 
(internal citation omitted). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the clear weight 
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of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made. Cal Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 898 P .2d 
1372, 1378 (Utah 1995) (internal citations omitted). 
ISSUE #3. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees. This issue was 
not preserved for appeal. 
. STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(a)(6), the following statutes and rules are of central 
importance to the appeal: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure("URCP") Rule 61. Harmless Error. No error in either 
the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is grounds for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("URAP") Rule 33. Damages for delay or 
frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for Delay of Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal 
case, if the court determines that a motion made of appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a 
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, 
or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper 
purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time 
that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
( c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. 
A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion 
for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of 
a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
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(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to 
the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages 
should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which 
form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless 
otheiwise ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of 
the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall 
grant a hearing. 
Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78B-2-113. Effect of payment, acknowledgement, 
or promise to pay. 
(1) An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable statute of 
limitations form the date: 
(a) the debt arose; 
(b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made by the 
debtor; or 
( c) a payment is made on the debt by the debtor. 
(2) If a right or action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable 
either as a cause of action or ground for defense. 
UCA § 78B-2-307 Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) after the last charge is made or the last payment is received: 
(a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing; 
(b) on an open store account for any goods, wares, or merchandise; 
( c) on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials 
furnished; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following section of Title 25, 
Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action 
one year, under Section 25-6-1 O; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-(5)(1 )(b ); or 
(c) Subsection 26-6-6(1); and 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
UCA § 78B-2-309. Within six years - Mesne profits or real property - Instrument in 
writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability found upon an instrument in writing, except 
those mentioned in section 78B-2-311; and 
(3) to recover fire suppression costs or other damages caused wildland fire. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(a)(7), the nature of the case regards the statute of 
limitations on an oral agreement. The course of proceedings and disposition of the court 
below is as follows: 
1. On May 15, 2014, Goldenwest Credit Union (the "Appellant"), filed a Complaint. 
R.1-6. 
2. On June 16, 2014, Kathleen Kenworthy (the "Appellee"), filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim. R.20-24. 
3. On August 8, 2014, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting Memorandum. R.63-70. 
4. On August 22, 2014, Appellant filed a Memorandum in Opposition. R. 73-94. 
5. On August 29, 2014, Appellee filed a Reply Memorandum. R.97-119. 
6. On November 7, 2014, Appellant and Appellee attended oral argument on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R.282-292 
7. On December 22, 2014, the trial court entered a ruling granting the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R.167-17 4. 




On April 14, 2014, the trial court entered an Order to Pay Attorney Fees. R.210-
10. On May 11, 2015, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. R.214-215. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(a)(7), a statement of the facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review are as follows: 
1. On April 24, 2006, Appellant and Appellee entered into a written loan agreement 
for the purchase a 2006 Nissan Frontier ("property") secured by the property. R.4-6. 
2. The written agreement contains a provision which states "when you are in default, 
the credit union can, without advance notice to you, require immediate payment of what 
you owe on the loan and take possession of the property." R.6. 
3. On May 9, 2008, Appellant claimed insurance proceeds on the property in the 
amount of $17,549.60 and applied such amount to the outstanding balance under the 
written agreement. R.41 and Appellant's Brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5. 
4. On May 9, 2008, Appellant and Appellee orally agreed to the payment of $200.00. 
R.168 and Appellant's Brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5. 
5. On May 9, 2008, Appellee paid Appellant $200. R.168. 
6. On May 9, 2008, Appellee told Appellant "best for now may be able to do more 
later". Appellant's Brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5. 
7. After May 9, 2008, Appellee made no payments to Appellant. R.168. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant has failed to demonstrate trial court error. The issues raised by 
Appellant are either not preserved on appeal, harmless error, or supported only by 
Appellants own assertions to which neither the facts of this case nor Utah law support. 
Appellant's claim is based on an oral agreement subject to the four-year statute of 
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limitations which expired prior to May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim. 
Therefore, Appellant's claim is barred and the trial court did not err in so ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE #1. The Appellant's argument that the trial court neglected to properly 
analyze the loan liner contract ("contract") as an installment contract. 
1. Appellant's Argument fails as it was not preserved for appeal. 
The preservation rule is an essential part to our adversary system ... This 
requires counsel to make a timely and specific objection on the record with 
evidence and legal authority to support it. .. If a party wishes to challenge on 
appeal the adequacy of the trial court's findings, trial counsel must first 
raise the objection in the trial court with sufficient clarity to alert the trial 
court to the alleged inadequacy ... The responsibility for detecting error is on 
the party asserting it, not on the court .. .It generally would be unfair to 
reverse a district court for a reason presented first on appeal ... Merely 
mentioning an issue does not preserve it ... Objection at trial based on one 
ground ... does not preserve for appeal any alternative ground for objection. 
Utah Appellate Law Update Vol. 26 No. 6 Pg. 20 (internal citation omitted). In the 
present case, Appellant failed to argue in the trial court that the contract should be 
analyzed as an installment contract. While Appellant did argue that the statute of 
limitation did not begin to run on the contract until June 15, 2008, it did so under the 
premise that the entire contract was breached on that date and not just an installment. 
R.7516. Therefore, such argument was not preserved for this appeal. 
Furthermore, Appellant failed to comply with URAP Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (BJ. 
Such requires Appellant "to provide a citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court." URAP Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (B). In the present case, 
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Appellant's brief does not contain the required citation or alternative statement of 
grounds. Therefore, such argument was not preserved on appeal. 
2. In the alternative, should this Court decide that such argument was preserved for 
appeal, such argument is harmless error as Appellant exercised its option to accelerate 
the alleged installments. URCP Rule 61 states "The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." URCP Rule 61. In the present case, the Appellant 
exercised its option to accelerate the alleged installments under the contract on May 9, 
2008 causing the debt to arise, or in Appellant's words "performance due", on each 
installment before May 12, 2008 as found by the trial court. "[A]ll the acceleration clause 
does is accelerate the due date of future installments to the date of the exercise of the 
right of acceleration." See Appellant's Brief Pg. 7 (citing Farmers Merchants Bank v. 
Templeton, 646 S.W.2d 920,923 (Tenn. App.1982)). 
"[T]here must be some exercise of the option, some affirmative act showing 
an intent to elect to accelerate; and that the additional clause 'without 
demand of notice' means, simply, that the holder may exercise such option 
without giving to the maker any notice of such intention and without 
demand for payment of the unpaid balance which would thus be 
accelerated ... such as by bringing suit thereon, or say, by entering the entire 
unpaid balance as immediately due and payable upon [the] books of 
account." 
Carmichael v. Rice, 49 N.M. 114, 117 (N.M. 1945) (cited by KIXX Inc. v. Stallion 
Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980). In the present case, the contract has an 
acceleration clause which states "when you are in default, the credit union can, without 
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advance notice to you, require immediate payment of what you owe on the loan and take 
possession of the property." R.6 (emphasis added). On May 9, 2008, Appellant claimed 
insurance proceeds on the property in the amount of $17,549.60 and applied such amount 
to the outstanding balance. R.41 and Appellant's Brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5. Such 
affirmative act, despite no notice to Appellee as none was required, constitutes 
Appellant's exercise of its option to accelerate any future installments, causing the debt to 
arise on each alleged installment before May 12, 2008 as found by the trial court. 
Therefore, the trial court's alleged neglect to analyze the contract as an installment 
contract is harmless as the statute of limitations on each alleged installment still expired 
prior to May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim. 
3. Also in the alternative, should this Court decide that such argument was preserved for 
appeal and that Appellant did not exercise its option to accelerate the alleged 
installments, such argument is harmless error as the statute of limitations on each 
alleged installment still expired prior to May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim. 
URCP Rule 61 states "The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties." URCP 61. In the present case, the debt arose on each alleged installment of the 
oral agreement on or before April 15, 2010 causing the four-year statute oflimitations on 
each alleged installment to expire no later than April 15, 2014 almost a month prior to 
May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim. "The cause of action accrues on each 
installment when it becomes due and the installment begins to run from that moment on 
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that installment." See Appellant's brief Pg. 7 ( citing Templeton). In the present case, 
Appellants allege that Appellee owes a principle amount of$4,614.02.R.218. On May 
9, 2008, the parties orally agreed to Appellee's repayment of debt in the amount of $200 
~ per month. R.168 1 2. The adjusted repayment term can be ascertained through 
calculation. See Appellant's brief Pg. 15. Such term would require 23 months of $200 
payments to pay the principle amount ($4,414.02/$200 = 23 months), causing the debt to 
arise on each alleged installment by April 15, 2010 (23 months after June 15, 2008). 
Therefore, the trial Court's alleged neglect to analyze the Contract as an installment 
contract is harmless as the four-year statute of limitations on each alleged installment still 
expired prior May 13, 2014 when Appellant filed its claim. 
ISSUE #2. Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in concluding that an oral 
modification to a written agreement is subject to four-year statute of limitations. 
1. Appellant's argument fails as Appellant had the burden of establishing that whether 
the oral agreement is a modification or a separate agreement is a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
The moving party has the burden of presenting evidence to demonstrate 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that judgment as a matter of 
law is proper. However, once the moving party challenges an element of 
the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present 
evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
Appellant's brief Pg. 12 (citing Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600, 117 (Utah 2008)). 
Material fact is defined as crucial to the determination of the issue at hand. See Black's 
Law Dictionary definition of Material Fact. In the present case, Appellee argued at trial 
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that whether the oral agreement is a modification or a separate agreement is not a genuine 
issue of material fact as both are oral obligations and subject to the four-year statute of 
limitations. R.285. Such challenge shifted the burden to the Appellant to establish 
sufficient evidence of a genuine issue of material fact. However, Appellant failed to meet 
this burden. Although Appellant argued that whether the oral agreement is a modification 
or a separate agreement is a question of fact, Appellant does not argue or supply evidence 
that is sufficient to establish that such fact is crucial to the determination of whether to 
apply the six or four-year statute of limitations. R.287. Therefore, Appellant failed to 
meet its burden and should not now be allowed to fault the trail court. 
Furthermore, the trial court supported Appellee 's argument that whether the oral 
agreement is a modification or a separate agreement is not a genuine issue of material 
fact. "[W]hether [the oral agreement] was a wholly new oral agreement ... or a 
modification to the Original Agreement ... the result is the same." R.171. In support of its 
conclusion, the Court cited the Strand case stating "where a specific material term of the 
contract in writing is subsequently changed orally, the statute of limitations for oral 
contracts applies." Strand v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 312 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1957). 
Although Appellant now attempts to distinguish the Strand case from the present one, 
such effort is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact. Therefore, Appellant fails to 
meet its burden and should not now be allowed to fault the trial court. 
2. Appellant's argument fails as Appellant incorrectly asserts that conditions precedent 
to enforcement of an oral modification also distinguish such from a separate agreement. 
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In its brief, Appellant asserts that part performance, meeting of the minds, statue of 
frauds, and a narrow change in terms distinguish the oral agreement as a modification. 
See Appellant's brief Pg. 12 & 13. However, such elements do not distinguish the oral 
agreement as a modification as such elements are also elements to establish a separate 
oral agreement. See Goggin v. Goggin, 267 P.3d 885, 893 ,I 37 (Utah 2011) (stating "it is 
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is 
essential to the formation of a contract") and Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 
1983) (stating "that part performance allows a court of equity to enforce an oral 
agreement, if it has been partially performed notwithstanding the statute [of frauds}"). 
The only element set forth by Appellant that is not also an element to establish a separate 
oral agreement is a narrow change in terms. In support of this element, Appellant cites 
the Fisher case, in which a change in the due date of annual payments was held to be a 
narrow modification, and argues that such is analogous to the change of the amount due 
in the present case. However, the Court in the Fisher case expressly disagrees with such 
analogy stating "the modification as limited to the timing of payments only. It did not 
change the amount due." Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah App. 1995). 
Therefore, the elements set forth by Appellant do not distinguish the oral agreement as a 
modification. 
3. Appellant's argument fails as Appellant ineptly attempts to distinguish the Strand case. 
In its brief, Appellant asserts that the Strand case is inapplicable because the terms of the 
modification can be proven without resort to parol evidence and the oral agreement is 
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within the statute of frauds. See Appellant's brief Pg. 14. However, the court in the 
Strand case does not rely, or even mention, either of these factors in affirming "the well-
established rule that actions on contracts which are partly in writing and partly oral are 
subject to the statute of limitations covering oral contracts" Strand at 563. Converse to 
Appellant's assertion, the Strand case is very analogous to the present case. In the Strand 
case, an oral agreement was entered between the parties for the purpose of adjusting the 
manner and time of performance (i.e. insurance, expenses, costs, completion date, capital 
expenditures). In the present case, an oral agreement was entered between the parties also 
for the purpose of adjusting the manner and time of performance (i.e. payment amount, 
balance due, which adjusts completion date). R.168 1 2. 
Moreover, the only fact distinguishing the Strand case from the present case is that 
the written contract in the Strand case contained a clause providing for subsequent 
adjustments by oral agreement. However, even with such a clause, the court in the Strand 
case still ruled that "the contract becomes an oral one and any claim arising under such a 
contract is governed by the [statute of limitations for oral contracts]" Strand at 564. 
Therefore, the Strand case is applicable and, pursuant thereto, the entire contract, both 
written and oral terms, are subject to the four-year statute of limitations. 
4. Appellant's Argument fails as Appellant's first ipse duit assertion is not supported by 
relevant law. In its brief, Appellant incorrectly asserts that: 
[W]here an agreement is governed by the statue of frauds and the evidence 
of the terms of the agreement are sufficient to meet the requirements of the 
statute of frauds, the written nature of the agreement is established and the 
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oral nature of any evidence is not determinative of the treatment of the 
contract. 
See Appellant's brief Pg. 15. In support of its assertion, Appellant cites Texas W. 
Ry. Co. v. Gentry, 8 S.W. 98 {Texas 1888). However, the Gentry case does not support 
Appellant's assertion for the following reasons: (1) the Gentry case is limited to corporate 
resolutions and not relevant to the present case; (2) the Gentry case is a Texas case and 
not binding precedent in Utah; (3) the court in the Strand case did not cite the Gentry case 
butLuglan v. Tomlin, 287 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1956) to support its 
holding that "changing some of the terms rendered the contract part oral and part written, · 
and the four year statute of limitations applies" Strand at 563; (4) the Luglan case, 
decided 68 years after the Gentry case, more adequately reflects the current position of 
the Texas court. Therefore, as Appellant's assertion is not supported by relevant law, 
such should not be adopted by this Court nor applied to the present case. 
5. In the alternative, should this court decide to adopt Appellant's assertion, Appellant's 
argument fails as the oral agreement does not satisfy the statue of frauds. "[the] standard 
for sufficient part performance [is]: First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and 
definite; Second, the acts done in performance of the contract must equally be clear and 
definite; and third, the acts must be in reliance on the contract." Martin at 275. In the 
present case, the terms of the oral agreement were not clear and definite. Although 
Appellee paid $200.00 on May 9, 2008, it was not clear whether payments would remain 
at $200.00. See Appellant's brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5 (stating "best for now may be able 
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to do more later"). Also, it is not clear whether such payments were to be applied to the 
entire balance on the note or remaining balance after offset of insurance proceeds. See 
Appellant's brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5 (stating "payment of $17,549.60 made on 05/08/08 
toward $487.21 payment). Also, as the payment amount and the balance due are not clear 
and definite the payment schedule and application of interest are also not clear and 
definite. Therefore, even if this Court adopts Appellant's assertion, such is not satisfied in 
the present case. 
6. Appellant's argument fails as Appellant' second ipse dixit assertion is not supported by 
relevant law. In its brief, Appellant incorrectly asserts that the oral agreement is subject 
to 6-year statute of limitations as the terms of the alleged modification does not require 
parol evidence. See Appellant's brief Pg. 15-16. In support of its assertion, and contrary 
to its previous argument that the Strand case is inapplicable, Appellant cites the Strand 
case which states "it is true that a written promise to pay without naming the amount may 
be construed as founded on a written instrument where an objective standard for 
determining the price is provided in the instrument." Strand at 563 ( emphasis added). 
However, such statement is separate from the rule of law relied on by the court in Strand 
and not relevant to the present case. In the Strand case, immediately following the 
statement, the court uses the disjunctive conjunction "but" to separate the statement from 
the following rule of law: "where a specific material term of the contract in writing is 
subsequently changed orally, the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts 
applies." Strand at 563. The Court then continues by explaining why the rule oflaw and 
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not the former statement is applicable. "[S]ince the written contract contained a precise 
payment schedule, a definite date for completion, and no promise to pay for depreciation 
or capital outlays, the later oral modification of these certain terms superseded and 
replaced those written." Strand at 563. Similarly, in the present case, the written contract 
contained a precise payment schedule and a definite date for completion. R.4. The later 
oral agreement superseded and replaced the written terms, making the rule of law, and 
not the former statement, applicable to the present case. Therefore, as Appellant's 
assertion is not supported by relevant law, such should not be adopted by this Court nor 
applied to the present case. 
Furthermore, the statement cited in the Strand case has been applied only when an 
objective standard for determining the price was provided in the written contract. See 
Lyons v. Moise, 183 S.W.2d 493 (Ky.App. 1944) ("Moise expressly agreed to reimburse 
Lyons for any advancements made him") and Rawleigh Co. v. Graham, 103 P.2d 1076 
(Wash. 1940) ("the writing contained a promise to pay and furnishes an objective 
standard for the ascertainment of any amount due thereunder"). In the present case, the 
written contract does not contain an objective standard for determining the price. R.4-6. 
The lack of such objective standard makes the statement inapplicable. Therefore, as 
Appellant's assertion is not supported by relevant law, such should not be adopted by this 
court nor applied to the present case. 
7. In the alternative should this Court decide to apply Appellant assertion, Appellant's 
argument fails as the terms of the oral agreement require parol evidence. Parol evidence 
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is defined as "testimony provided by any witness in court." See Black's Law Dictionary 
definition of Paro I Evidence. In the present case, the terms of the alleged modification 
require testimony provided by a witness. Such testimony is required to establish: ( 1) the 
amount of the payment; (2) the balance on the note; (3) and the payment schedule, and 
(4) application of interest. See Appellant's brief Addendum #2 Pg. 5 (stating "best for 
now may be able to do more later" and "payment of 17,549.60 made on 05/08/08 toward 
$487 .21 payment). Therefore, even if this Court applies Appellant's assertion, such is not 
satisfied in the present case. 
ISSUE #3. Appellant's argument that the award of attorney fees be reversed. 
1. Appellant's argument fails as it was not preserved on appeal. 
The preservation rule is an essential part to our adversary system ... This 
requires counsel to make a timely and specific objection on the record with 
evidence and legal authority to support it ... If a party wishes to challenge on 
appeal the adequacy of the trial court's findings, trial counsel must first 
raise the objection in the trial court with sufficient clarity to alert the trial 
court to the alleged inadequacy ... the responsibility for detecting error is on 
the party asserting it, not on the court ... it generally would be unfair to 
reverse a district court for a reason presented first on appeal. .. merely 
mentioning an issue does not preserve it ... objection at trial based on one 
ground ... does not preserve for appeal any alternative ground for objection. 
Utah Appellate Law Update Vol. 26 No. 6 Pg. 20. In the present case, Appellant 
failed to object to Appellee's Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees. See Appellant's 
brief Pg. 4. Therefore, such argument was not preserved for this appeal. 
2. Appellant's requests that the issue of expenses including attorney fees for this appeal 
be evaluated by the trial court when the final order is entered fails. "When a party who 
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received attorney fees below ... prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to reasonably 
attorney fees incurred on appeal." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 30 (Utah 1988). In the 
present case, the Appellee received attorney fees in the trial court. R. 210 - 211. 
Therefore, should Appellee prevail on this appeal, this Court should award Appellee its 
attorney fees on appeal. 
3. Appellee is entitled to attorney fees on appeal and damages. "Briefs which are not in 
compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the 
court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer." URAP Rule 24(k). We 
agree that Defendant's brief wholly fails to comply with Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and must be stricken. State v. Smith, 238 P.3d 1103 (Utah App. 
2010). The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the 
order indicated ... citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court." Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (B). In the present case, Appellant's brief fails to satisfy 
such requirement. Therefore, Appellant's brief should be stricken and this Court should 
award Appellee its attorney fees on appeal. 
Furthermore, this Court should award Appellee its attorney fees and damages. 
URAP Rule 33 states: 
... if the court determines that a ... appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include, 
single or double costs, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party ... for purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal ... is one that is not 
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grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good 
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
URAP Rule 33. Sanctions are appropriate for appeals obviously without merit, 
without reasonable likelihood of success, and which result in the delay of a proper 
judgment." Redd v. Hill, 304 P.3d 861 (Utah 2013). A frivolous appeal is defined as one 
in which no justiciable question has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as 
devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed. Hunt v. Hunt, 785 
P.2d 414,416 (Utah 1990). In the present case, Appellant's brief raised three issues each 
of which was either not preserved, harmless error, or supported only by Appellants own 
ipse dixit assertions to which neither the facts of the case nor Utah law support. 
Therefore, this Court should award Appellee its attorney fees and damages. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth herein, Appellant has failed to demonstrate trial court error. Therefore, 
Appellee respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court ruling and award the 
Appellee attorney fees on appeal and damages pursuant to URAP 33. 
DATED this 8th day of February 2016, 
Peter A. Klc and Associates, PLLC 
<id: I 3 Afi04 o 
~A.Kie 
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I hereby Certify that two (2) true and correct copies and one (1) searchable CD of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed by first class mail with postage fully 
prepaid to the following: 
Dana T. Farmer 
SMITH KNOWLES P.C. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
DATED this 8th day of February 2016, 
Peter A. K.lc and Associates, PLLC 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to URAP Rule 24(a)(l 1), no addendum is necessary as Appellee as 
referred to the addendum of Appellant in accordance with URAP Rule 24(b)(2). 
·@l 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
Pursuant to Rule 24(t)(l)(C), I hereby certify that Appellee's Brief complies with 
the type-volume limitation. I have relied on the word count of the word processing 
system used to prepare the brief to determine that the brief contain 6224 words. 
DATED this 8th day ofFebruary 2016, 
Peter A. Kie and Associates, PLLC 
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